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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – JUVENILE JURISDICTION 
 
Summary 
 
 An appeal from a district court order granting writ of mandamus directing the justice 
court to dismiss a criminal complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. The Court held that NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) - which divests juvenile jurisdiction 
when juvenile felons are identified after they turn 21 - governs jurisdiction over any proceeding 
initiated after the statute’s effective date, regardless of when the offense was committed. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 DNA collected from a 2005 kidnapping and sexual assault later identified the perpetrator 
as Gregory Barren in 2009. Barren was 17 at the time of the offense and 21 when he was 
identified. In October 2009, the State brought charges against Barren in justice court for first-
degree kidnapping with a deadly weapon, sexual assault with a deadly weapon, and attempted 
sexual assault with a deadly weapon. Each charge was an A or B felony if committed by an 
adult. 
 
 The State brought charges against Barren in justice court, which transferred to juvenile 
court. However, juvenile court found it lacked jurisdiction because charges were not initiated 
before Barren turned 21. The case was subsequently transferred back to the justice court which 
accepted jurisdiction on the basis that newly enacted NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2)
2
 applied to the facts 
of Barren’s case. The justice court noted that Barren would not have been subject to juvenile 
court jurisdiction even prior to the 2009 amendment, and Nevada law required that some court, 
district or juvenile, must always have jurisdiction over a criminal defendant. 
 
 Barren filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting the district court order the justice 
court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  The district court granted the petition and remanded the 
case to the justice court to dismiss, reasoning that NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) could not apply 
retroactively because it would be an ex post facto violation.  The State appealed. 
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 By Amanda Ireland. 
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 NEV. REV. STAT. § 62B.330(3)(E)(1) (2009). The provision (which went into effect October 1) divests a juvenile 
court of jurisdiction over a person who committed a category A or B felony between 16 and 18 years of age, but is 
not identified by law enforcement as having committed the offense until the person reaches 21 years of age.  
Discussion 
 
 Justice Hardesty wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court sitting in a three justice panel. 
The Court stressed that some court always has jurisdiction over a criminal defendant. The issue 
here was not whether a court had jurisdiction, but which court had jurisdiction over Barren. 
 To determine jurisdiction in Barren’s case, the Court examined the statutory scope of the 
juvenile court’s jurisdiction.  Under NRS 62B.330, “the juvenile court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction over a child . . . who is alleged or adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act.”3 
The provisions defined a child as “[a] person who is less than 21 years of age and subject to the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court for an unlawful act that was committed before the person 
reached 18 years of age.”4  However, the breadth of delinquency is limited by NRS 62B.330(3), 
which lists acts not within juvenile jurisdiction such as murder, sexual assault or felonies 
committed with a weapon. Further, NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) expressly excludes cases such as 
Barren’s: (e) a category A or B felony . . . if the person was at least 16 years of age but less than 
18 years of age when the offense was committed, and (2) the person is not identified by law 
enforcement . . . until the person reaches 21 years of age. 
 
 The parties disputed whether NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) governs jurisdiction in this case 
because it did not go into effect until after the date of the offenses.
5
 The Court concluded that 
retroactivity analysis was unnecessary because “statutes ‘conferring or ousting jurisdiction’ that 
‘speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties’ generally 
do not raise concerns about retroactivity.”6 Additionally, the Court noted that many courts have 
held that juvenile jurisdiction “. . . does not depend on the defendant’s age at the time the 
criminal act was committed, but [on] his age at the time judicial proceedings were initiated.”7 In 
State v. Little, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that determining a juvenile court’s jurisdiction 
based on the offender’s age at the time of the offense could create “absurd” results.8 Under such 
a rule “a person [could] commit crimes before his sixteenth birthday, happy in the knowledge 
that his worse fate, if caught, [would] be a brief period of treatment as a delinquent child.”9  
 
 Statutory language limits juvenile jurisdiction to persons less than 21 years of age. So, to 
conclude that juvenile courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by minors 
regardless of their age when proceedings commenced would render statutory age limit language 
superfluous. To avoid such an “absurd result”, contrary to the plain language of NRS 
62B.330(3)(e), the Court concluded that jurisdiction in Barren’s case was determined on the day 
the State initiated proceedings rather than the date Barren allegedly committed the offenses. 
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 The Court noted that NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) applied to offenses already committed the day it went into effect, 
because the language referred to a person who “was” at least 16, when the offense “was committed.”  
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 Id. at 630. 
Conclusion 
 
 NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) governs jurisdiction over any proceedings initiated after the 
provision went into effect on October 1, 2009, regardless of when the offense was committed. 
